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Abstract
Electoral behaviour in recently established democracies has been more frequently 
treated from the point of view of its unpredictability, volatility and personalistic 
elements than that of its “fundamentals”. In this paper, we wish to contribute to redress 
this imbalance by advancing a forecasting model for general elections in a young 
democracy, Portugal. Building on the very familiar notion that the vote for the 
incumbent can be predicted on the basis of “economics” and “politics”, we capture 
“economics” through a nonlinear specification of economic growth. Furthermore, we 
include two structural features of Portuguese politics, which have entailed a systematic 
electoral punishment for the centre-left Socialist Party as the incumbent and for all 
incumbents involved in political conflicts with the elected president in Portugal’s semi-
presidentialism.
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1. Introduction
One of the often noted traits of elections in the “third-wave” democracies is the
high level of uncertainty regarding electoral outcomes (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006: 
221), a consequence of low levels of party system institutionalization, high electoral 
volatility, the shallow anchoring of the vote in ideological or partisan predispositions 
and the prevalence of personalistic voting. 
According to most of the literature, Portugal is not an exception to this pattern.
Individual voting behaviour is weakly explained by stable social cleavages and electoral 
volatility has been extremely high ever since democratization in the 1970s (Gunther and 
Montero, 2001). Affect towards party leaders has been shown to play an extremely 
strong role in voting choices (Lobo, 2006). Positions on most issues – with the 
exception of the economy – play a modest and rather confusing role in electoral 
behaviour (Freire, 2007). Although pre-election polls conducted in the week 
immediately before the elections seem to converge to relatively accurate results, those 
conducted few weeks or months before election day display wide divergences and 
fluctuations, suggesting a very late crystallization of the vote and large numbers of late 
deciders (Magalhães, 2005). Accordingly, discussions and explanations of concrete 
election outcomes in Portugal typically place great stock in campaign events, media 
coverage, and leaders’ traits and personalities (Lloyd-Jones, 2001; Salgado, 2007).
All this, together with the inevitably small number of observations of democratic 
election outcomes, has probably served to dissuade scholars from attempting to devise
models forecasting election results in recently established democracies. A look at the 
English-language literature on election forecasting in scientific journals reveals that, 
* Manuscript without author identifiers
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2outside the United States  where a vast literature on the subject has been published 
since the 1970s1  only in cases such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany have 
such models been commonly proposed.2 However, there are, prima facie, some reasons 
to believe that, among “third-wave” democracies, Portugal is perhaps one of the cases 
where attempts at election forecasting are more promising. On the one hand, from 1975 
until today, already twelve general legislative elections have been conducted, providing 
a number of observations for analysis that, albeit very small, is in any case larger than in 
any other “third-wave” democracy. On the other hand, Portugal’s party system, political 
institutions and structure of electoral competition have provided a contextual setting
where the basic assumptions of most forecasting models are closely approximated. With 
a small number of effective parliamentary parties,3 basic alternation in power between a 
large centre-right (the Social Democratic Party, PSD) and a large centre-left party (the 
Socialist Party, PS), a unicameral “arena” parliament, strong intraparty discipline and a 
president lacking effective veto-powers (Magalhães, 2003), elections in Portugal do 
tend to exhibit the kind of “clarity of responsibility” and the direct link with the 
allocation of executive power that most forecasting models tend to assume.
In this article, we will suggest that, in fact, electoral outcomes in Portugal end up 
being quite predictable within a reasonably small margin of error. We formulate a vote 
function model to forecast the percent share obtained by the incumbent party in 
Portuguese general elections. We rely on the basic familiar notion in such forecast 
models: that the vote for the incumbent party is a function of “economics” and 
1 For reviews, see, for example, Lewis-Beck and Rice (1992), Lewis-Beck (2005), and Campbell (2008).
2 For the UK, see, among many others, Whiteley (1979), Mughan (1987), the symposiums of papers 
published in Electoral Studies (vol. 23, issue 2) and the British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations (volume 7), and, more recently, Lebo and Norpoth (2008) and Whiteley (in press); for France, 
see, for example, Jérome and Jérome-Speziari (2004) and Lewis-Beck, Bélanger and Fauvelle-Aymar 
(2008); for Germany, see Norpoth and Gschwend (2003).
3 In the twelve elections since 1975, the average “effective number of parliamentary parties” (Laakso and 
Taagepera, 1979) is 2.8.
3“politics”. However, we implement such notion in a somewhat less familiar way. On the 
one hand, without abandoning the idea that elections are, to some extent, a referendum 
on economic performance, we suggest that a non-linear specification of economic 
variables provides a more realistic approach to the way they actually play out on 
election outcomes. On the other hand, out of necessity, we end up replacing the 
common use of “government popularity” or “voting intention” survey-based indicators 
with other variables that, in fact, may actually end up bringing us closer to the political 
“fundamentals” in Portuguese electoral behaviour. One of those variables addresses a 
basic asymmetry between the left and the right of the Portuguese party system and the 
way that asymmetry entails a structural electoral punishment for centre-left 
governments. Another derives from the importance of the presidential office in the 
Portuguese “premier-presidential” brand of semi-presidentialism (Shugart, 2006). 
2. The model
Many (if not most) forecast models include some measure of lagged economic 
performance (Lewis-Beck, 2005). There are good reasons to do the same in the case of 
Portugal. Research using aggregate survey data on aggregate government popularity or 
voting intentions suggests that voters are retrospective, punishing or rewarding 
government parties on the basis of past economic performance (Veiga and Veiga, 2004a 
and 2004b). Studies based on the impact of actual economic conditions (rather than 
individual perceptions) on individual-level behaviour confirm this notion and show that 
Portugal is one of the European Union countries where the electoral effects of the 
economy are largest (van de Brug, van der Eijk and Franklin, 2007). Finally, confirming 
existing theorization (Hibbs, 1977; Powell and Whitten, 1993), not all leading economic 
indicators have the same effect on support for different government parties in Portugal:
4while support for left-wing governments is mostly affected by unemployment, the 
effects of inflation are highest for right-wing ones (Veiga and Veiga, 2004a). 
Modelling the latter effects, using interactions between economic indicators and 
dummy variables for the ideological leaning of the parties in government, would 
probably be closer to ideal for our purposes. However, this is a luxury that we cannot 
afford in this particular case. First, unemployment data before the 1980s in Portugal is 
notoriously unreliable. Second, with so few observations of election results, this would 
entail a fatal reduction in degrees of freedom. Thus, we choose to employ a single 
measure of economic performance: the yearly real GDP growth, measured with a lag of 
two quarters in relation to the one when the election took place.4,5
Furthermore, we submit that a non-linear transformation of the economic growth 
variable provides a more realistic approach to the way voting behaviour is likely to be 
affected by economic performance. If we had simply included the growth rate as an 
explanatory variable we were implicitly assuming that a change of the growth rate from 
0 to 1 percent had the same impact as a change from 9 to 10 percent. This assumption is 
hardly justifiable. While the latter change is likely to make little difference in the public 
perception of very high economic growth rates, the former represents the difference 
between stagnation and (albeit low) growth. Thus, instead, we consider a non-linear
monotonic transformation of the growth rate that allows the model to puff up the effect 
of growth rate changes when the growth rate is small. Let Xt be the growth rate (in 
percentage terms) and max(X) the highest observed growth rate. Instead of Xt, we use 
4 Source: OECD. We also tried different lag structures. Predictably, the worst fit  and a statistically 
insignificant coefficient  was obtained with real yearly GDP growth measured up to the end of the 
quarter where the election took place. Lags of one or three quarters provided better results, but both worse 
than the two-quarter lag. 
5 The other economic variable that is typically used in these kinds of studies is inflation. This variable was 
statistically not significant at the conventional levels.
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Figure 1 about here
Measures of economic performance tend to be combined, in the traditional 
political economy “Iowa Model”, with some measure of how government has 
performed in other issues, more commonly, government popularity. In the Portuguese 
case, practical considerations exclude the use of such indicators from our model: there is 
no reliable government or prime-ministerial popularity poll data in Portugal before 1986 
(Veiga and Veiga, 2004a). Including such a variable in the model would thus lead us to 
lose five observations, another luxury we cannot afford. 
It may be the case, however, that our inability to employ such an indicator ends 
up being a blessing in disguise. In the forecasting literature, there is considerable 
discussion about the adequate balance between purely predictive and explanatory goals. 
While some see no reason not to employ the best available data to obtain the most 
accurate predictions  such as, for example, results of trial-heat polls conducted close to 
the election (Campbell, 2000)  others worry about near-tautological consequences of 
“placing the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation” (Lewis-Beck, 
2005: 155). This begs the question, however, of the extent to which the use of
6government popularity measures, even if lagged, as a predictor of the vote, is itself able 
to evade such near-tautology (van der Eijk, 2005). In any case, regardless of how one 
stands in that particular debate, our practical inability to use popularity data creates, at 
the very least, an interesting challenge. If we are indeed able to produce reasonably 
accurate forecasts of the vote without resorting to poll data on popularity or voting 
intentions collected close to the elections themselves, having been forced to specify the 
“political” elements of the model in a different way, it is possible that we end up 
coming closer to the objective fundamentals of what explains elections results, rather 
than relying on attitudinal variables that may be themselves affected by those 
fundamentals.
We thus propose two political variables, one related to particular features of 
electoral competition and the party system in Portugal and another to he country’s
political institutions. First, an interesting result of studies using time-series data on 
aggregate government popularity and voting intention for the incumbent in Portugal is 
that, when all other economic and institutional factors are held constant, the coefficient 
for a “Socialist Party” dummy (with PSD as the reference category) is negative and 
significant (Veiga and Veiga 2004a and 2004b). There are good reasons for such a 
pattern to emerge. Unlike what occurs in the right of the party system, where the voters’ 
option between the PSD and the CDS-PP tends to be made mostly on the basis of 
strategic grounds and leader evaluations, choices within the left block are more strongly 
based in social and ideological grounds (Lobo, 2006).6 Furthermore, the Portuguese 
Socialist Party has, since its very inception, functioned as catch-all party and adopted 
centrist policies while in government. Unencumbered by links to the labour movement 
and involved in an enduring struggle against the Communist Party (PCP) first, for 
6 For the distant origins of these patterns, see, for example, Gunther (2005).
7regime democratization and, later, for the liberalization of the a highly statist economy, 
the PS was often placed in a dilemma that, at the right, the PSD was able to avoid: its 
success in attracting and sustain a centrist electorate was often counterbalanced, 
following incumbencies, by losses to leftist parties (the PCP first, and later also to the 
newly created Leftist Block – BE).7
One consequence of this is visible when we analyze the ideological composition 
of the PS electorate through time: while the successful bids for power of the Socialists 
have always entailed the ability to attract the strategic vote of part of the leftist 
electorate, their passage through government was always followed by a desertion of 
segments of that same electorate to the parties in the left (Gómez Fortes, 2007). In some 
cases – 1999, for instance  good economic performance and the corresponding afflux 
of centrist voters seems to have been enough to compensate such losses. However, 
ceteris paribus, as an incumbent party, the PS seems to be more affected by desertions 
of leftist voters than the PSD is affected by desertions of rightists. Thus, the second 
variable in our model is a dummy variable with value 1 when the incumbent was the 
PS: we expect a negative sign, representing the structural punishment endured by the 
Socialists after incumbency that follows from this particular structure of party 
competition.
Second, we take into account the semi-presidential nature of the Portuguese 
government and the particular role played by the president in the political system. 
Unlike what occurs in the French case, where the president is the de facto head of the 
parliamentary majority (Thiébault, 2003), or in established cases of “president-
parliamentarism” (Shugart, 2006), Portugal’s brand of semi-presidential government 
has (with the exception of a brief stint from 1978 to 1979 of three short-lived cabinets 
7 In 1985, the short-lived Partido Renovador Democrático (PRD), generally perceived to be to the left of 
the PS, was also arguably also the recipient of defections from the PS.
8of “presidential initiative”) never placed the popularly elected President in control of 
executive power. However, Portuguese presidents have also typically enjoyed and 
exerted more powers than their counterparts in other semi-presidential systems such as 
Ireland, Austria, or Iceland, where candidates tend to be recruited among minor party 
figures or “political outsiders” and elected presidents tend to play a mostly ceremonial 
and symbolic role (Kristinsson, 1999; Müller, 1999). Instead, Portuguese presidents  as 
well their counterparts in many Eastern European semi-presidential systems  occupy
somewhat of a middle ground in terms of presidential intervention in politics in 
comparison with those two extremes (Neto, 2003). Even after a reduction of powers 
obtained through a 1982 constitutional amendment, Portuguese presidents can dissolve 
parliament, refer bills for constitutional review, and veto legislation. And although 
vetoes can be overridden by a parliamentary majority and constitutional referrals are of 
uncertain efficacy as veto-points, the public visibility brought to bear on government 
policies in this way can entail political costs that provide presidents with some leverage 
vis-à-vis governments, and can even be used in “wars of attrition” against them in 
situation of premier-presidential conflicts (Magalhães, 2007).
Such conflicts have, in fact, happened recurrently not only in Portugal (Frain, 
1995) but also in several Eastern European semi-presidential systems (Baylis, 1996; 
Protsyk, 2005 and 2006). We expect them to entail important electoral consequences for 
incumbent parties. Elected by majority run-off systems, presidents obtain shares of the 
vote typically larger than that of any single party in a proportional representation 
system. The popular legitimacy derived from this provides not only justification for 
enhanced intervention in politics (Duverger, 1980; Protsyk, 2005), but also an initial
reservoir of support that, in cases of conflict with governments, is only slowly 
extinguished: as they lack formal executive powers and tend to be seen as “above” 
9everyday politics, presidents’ opposition to incumbent prime ministers tends to be 
perceived benevolently by more voters than those who would support the actions of a 
purely partisan political actor. 
Thus, we argue that one crucial variable explaining the electoral performance of 
incumbent parties is the existence of such open and public conflicts between presidents 
and prime-ministers. Several Portuguese elections were held following such periods: the 
1979, 1980, 1983 and 1985 elections, a protracted period of terse relations between 
Ramalho Eanes and the several centre-right and centre-left governments (Bruneau and 
Macleod, 1986); the 1995 elections, following the conflict between Mário Soares and 
the PSD majority government (Corkill, 1996); and the 2005 elections, following the 
dissolution of parliament and consequent fall of the centre-right coalition formed by the 
PSD and the smaller rightist CDS-Popular Party (Salgado, 2007). We thus created a 
simple dummy variable, coded 1 for those elections, and expect it to have a negative 
sign: incumbents are likely to be punished in elections that follow periods of premier-
presidential conflict.
In short, then, we propose a simple forecast model for the Portuguese general 
elections:
uCONFLICTSOCINCGROWTHVOTE %%%% 3210 , (1)
where VOTE is the percentage of the vote for the incumbent party in legislative 
elections in relation to all valid, null and blank votes; GROWTH is the non-linear
monotonic transformation of the yearly GDP growth rate described before with a lag of 
two-quarters; SOCINC is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the incumbent was 
the Socialist Party; CONFLICT is another dummy variable which takes the value 1 for 
the 1979, 1980, 1983, 1985 and 2005 elections; and u is a random shock.
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3. Model estimation and evaluation
3.1 The data
Table 1 presents the data used for the model’s estimation and evaluation. We 
start by leaving one of the twelve democratic elections aside, that which took place in 
1975 for the constituent assembly, since the incumbent at the time was a provisional 
government whose composition was unrelated to any electoral outcomes. We do include 
the 1976 election, however: by then, the provisional government in power was 
dominated by figures of the Socialist Party, which allows us to treat it as the incumbent. 
This leaves us with eleven elections. Of those, five took place following coalition 
governments: 1979, 1980, 1983, 1985 and 2005. In these cases, we considered the vote 
for the largest party in the coalition, in all cases clearly either the PS or the PSD. 
Finally, in the 1980 elections, the incumbent was a pre-electoral coalition (called 
Democratic Alliance, AD) between the PSD, the CDS-PP and a very small Monarquist 
party, which presented itself both for the 1979 and the 1980 elections. In that case, we 
estimated the vote for the PSD on the basis of the results of the immediately prior and 
posterior elections.8
Table 1 about here
3.2 The results
Using OLS, we estimated equation 1, with the following results (t-statistics in 
parenthesis):
CONFLICTSOCINCGROWTHVOTE
)34.10()30.4()66.2()73.20(
30.1979.718.189.44

             (2)
N=11 (1976-2005)   R2=0.94   Adj. R2=0.92   D-W=1.56   SEE=2.86
8 More specifically, we calculated the average proportion of the vote obtained by the PSD in relation to 
the sum of the vote shares for the three parties in the 1976 and 1983 elections, and estimated the vote for 
the PSD in 1980 as that proportion applied to the AD vote.
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All coefficients are significant at p < 0.05 in a two-tailed test and all have the expected 
directions: growth increases the vote share of the incumbent party, while Socialist 
incumbents and those involved in political conflicts with the President tend to be 
punished. With respect to relative importance, the premier-presidential conflict variable 
(standardized coefficient: -1.03) clearly edges over the others (-.41 for SOCINC and .26 
for GROWTH). As table 1 shows, the two worst performances of the model using the 
entire sample are in 1980 and in 1995, but all studentized residuals remained well below 
2 (with a highest of 1.76 in 1995). The average absolute prediction error within the 
sample was a mere 1.93 percentage points. With the exclusion of the 1976 election 
(where the residual was close to zero), five of the residuals show an overestimation of 
the incumbent’s vote, while five others show an underestimation, suggesting no 
systematic bias. The standard error of the estimate (SEE) suggests that, for a typical 
future election, the forecast will be off by some 2.9 points.
3.3 Out-of-sample performance
We recognize that inference based on such a small sample may be difficult to rely on. 
One can argue that the lack of degrees of freedom may cause one observation to have a 
huge impact on the final results, meaning that effects of an outlier are not washed way 
by a big sample. Therefore, in order to increase the reliability of our results, we perform 
a more demanding analysis and examine the “out-of-sample” forecasts: excluding each 
election at a time, we re-estimate the model with the remaining observations. Then we 
check if the estimated coefficients change in a significant way and, of course, how the 
model forecasts the omitted observation. 
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In all these re-estimated models, the signs of the coefficients never changed, and 
only in one case (when the 1976 election was excluded) did one of them (GROWTH) 
fail to reach statistical significance with p < 0.10 (although it is still significant if we 
consider a one tail test). The estimated coefficients were remarkably stable: the 
minimum estimated value for the INTERCEPT, GROWTH, CONFLICT and SOCINC
coefficients were, respectively, 43.96, 0.95, -20.27, -9.28; while the maximum values 
were 46.42, 1.28, -18.44, -6.68. The standard deviations of the estimated coefficients 
were, respectively, 0.65, 0.10, 0.59 and 0.68. With such low standard deviations, there 
are good reasons to believe that the results are reliable.
Table 1 also lists all out-of-sample forecasts and their errors. The largest out-of-
sample error was 5.66, underestimating the PSD vote in 1995. But in seven out of 
eleven cases, the absolute error was lower than three percentage points, and the mean 
absolute out-of-sample error is 2.84. Although this compares unfavourably, for 
example, with the out-of-sample performance of most forecast models for the United 
States presidential elections (Lewis Beck, 2005: 157), it actually fares quite well in 
comparison with the model devised to forecast the 2001 UK elections (Lewis-Beck, 
Nadeau and Bélanger, 2004) once the whole 1995-2001 period is included (Bélanger, 
Lewis-Beck, and Nadeau, 2005). The comparison between our results and the 
performance of pre-election polls in Portugal is even more flattering. The mean absolute 
error committed by the polls published in the last week of each election in Portugal 
from 1991 to 2005 in the estimation of the incumbent’s vote share ranges from 1.8 to 6 
percentage points, and the grand mean reaches 3 points (Magalhães, 2005). 
Interestingly, both the lowest and highest out-of-sample forecast errors committed by 
our model are below those of the polls, and the mean for those five elections between
1991 and 2005 is, precisely, of 3 percentage points. And this was obtained, note,
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without including in the model any variables measuring vote intentions and government 
popularity: just an economic growth indicator measured two quarters before the election
and dummies capturing which was the incumbent party and whether elections took 
place following a politically conflictual relation between the president and the cabinet.
3.4 Is the small sample a big problem?
There are two main consequences of a small sample size. The first one is large standard 
errors, which lead to lower t-statistics, which can lead to incorrect non-rejections of the 
null hypothesis. The second one is the high sensibility of the estimators to small 
changes in the sample. Since all our estimated coefficients are highly statistically 
significant and, as explained before (when performing the out-of-sample forecast 
experiments), the estimated coefficients are quite insensible to small changes in the 
sample, this seems not to be a problem. Still, for robustness and to assess the severity of 
the problem, we used the condition index test (Belsley, 1991).
The condition index test is based on a simple idea. If the sample size is too small 
XX '  will be a near singular matrix. In this case, at least one of the eigenvalues of the 
matrix XX ' will be close to zero. Therefore, close to zero eigenvalues suggest that the 
small sample size may be a problem. The test involves the following steps: (1) 
standardization of the explanatory variables to unit variance;9 (2) computation of the 
eigenvalues of the standardized XX ' ; (3) the condition index number is given by 
minmax OO , where  minmax OO  is the highest (lowest) eigenvalue. Based on Monte Carlo 
simulations, Belsley concludes that there is evidence of severe linear dependence 
between the variables if the index is above 30. If the index is between 10 and 30, there 
is evidence of a moderate to severe sample problem. Computing the condition index of 
9 This normalization is essential because the test is scale dependent.
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our model, we find a value of 6.79. A value below the suggested bounds, indicating that 
linear dependence, caused by the small sample, is not a serious concern.
4. A True Out-of-Sample Forecast: the Portuguese General Elections of 2009
Naturally, any forecasts are subject to errors. Even assuming that the model is 
perfectly specified, there are two sources of error. The first obvious source is the 
residual uncertainty. The other source is parameter uncertainty (measured by the 
standard error of the estimated coefficients). Overall, the forecast standard error is given 
by   '' 122 tt xXXsxs  , where s is the standard error of regression,   12 ' XXs  is the 
covariance matrix of the estimated coefficients and tx  is the vector with the values of 
the independent variables that form the basis of the forecast. With normally distributed
residuals, these forecast standard errors can be used to estimate forecasting intervals.
Given the results expressed in equation (2), one can predict the incumbent’s 
party share of votes in the next general elections that will take place in Portugal in the 
fourth semester of 2009. We can, naturally, consider different scenarios, but we look 
first at what we believe is the more plausible at the time of this writing. According to 
the IMF, the predicted GDP growth rate of Portugal for 2009 is 1 percent,10 a value of 
the same magnitude as the predicted GDP growth for 2008 both by the Bank of Portugal 
and the OECD. Therefore, we will consider, in our basis scenario, a GDP growth 
between the third semester of 2008 and the second semester of 2009 of 1 percent. So 
far, there is no open conflict between the government and the President and we 
anticipate no such conflict in the near future. Finally, there is no uncertainty about our 
third independent variable: the incumbent party is the PS (the Socialist Party).
10 International Monetary Fund, Portugal: 2008 Article IV Consultation, Preliminary Conclusions of the 
Mission, July 14th 2008. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2008/071408.htm.
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Table 2 about here
According to our forecasts, in our most likely scenario (scenario 1), the incumbent party
 the Socialist Party  will receive 39.3 percent of the vote in the 2009 elections. Would 
this be enough to win the election? In the history of the Portuguese legislative elections, 
the second most voted party or pre-electoral coalition never obtained more than 38 
percent of the vote. In other words, a party or pre-electoral coalition that obtained 38 
percent or more of the vote has always been the winner. In such a scenario, the PS 
seems well poised to be the most voted party and thus receive the invitation by the 
President to form government.
In scenario 2, however, with a more pessimistic economic forecast (no growth), 
the Socialists’ victory becomes more questionable. Assuming stability in the sum of 
blank, null votes and those for the smaller parties non-represented in parliament in 
relation to the previous (2005) election (about 5 percent), 37.1 percent would allow the 
PS to obtain more votes than the PSD only if the sum of the vote shares of the PCP, the 
BE and the CDS-PP equalled or exceeded 21 percent. This was indeed the case in 2005, 
but it was neither in 2002 (18 percent) nor 1999 (20 percent). Thus, according to our 
model, economic performance throughout the second half of 2008 and the first half of 
2009 might very well dictate the difference between victory and defeat for the 
Socialists.
Scenarios 3 and 4 are much less plausible, and serve mostly to illustrate the 
effects of the different variables. In scenario 3, with a dream economic performance, the 
Socialist Party would be in the verge of winning an absolute majority of the seats in the 
Parliament (historically, in Portugal, a share between 43 percent and 44 percent of the 
votes is enough to win 50 percent of the seats). In scenario 4, we return to our basic 
16
scenario, but assume that a conflict between the President and the Government will 
develop until the election. The effects are huge, as one can see, and the incumbent party 
would be expected to receive about 20 percent of the vote, i.e, one of its worst electoral 
performances ever (together with 1985). This shows how, in a semi-presidential regime
as the Portuguese one, the presidential powers and the consequences of their exercise 
may go well beyond what the President’s constitutional prerogatives suggest.
5. Conclusion
Strong claims that models of election forecasting are really testing theories about 
electoral behaviour should probably be taken with a grain of salt. Such models rely 
exclusively on aggregate data, observations are few and the demands of parsimony in 
order to avoid overfitting can lead to poorly specified models. Furthermore, in our case, 
and in spite of our best efforts to keep endogenous variables away from the model, we 
cannot exclude the possibility that one of them  premier-presidential conflict  suffers 
from such a problem. For example, such conflicts may emerge from the perception that 
the incumbent is electorally vulnerable on account of some political and economic 
factor  competence of the prime minister, other aspects of economic performance 
besides economic growth, and so on  that is unaccounted for in the model. This does 
not necessarily detract from the model’s predictive capacities, but does raise questions 
about its theoretical soundness. However, forecast models should probably not be seen 
as mere parlour games either. All attempts at explaining voting behaviour entail an 
implicit (even if sometimes unacknowledged) claim about prediction (Sanders, 2005), 
and the ability to confront those claims with actual election results is a very demanding, 
even if perhaps imperfect, test of extant explanations. At the very least, forecasting 
models can point to interest directions for research and new hypotheses, as well as
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contribute to change the point of view from which electoral data are conventionally
viewed.
From this point of view, we think our results call attention to important aspects
of electoral behaviour in Portugal and, perhaps, in several recently established 
democracies. The literature on voting behaviour in those democracies places great 
emphasis on electoral volatility and uncertainty, as well as on the impact of short-term 
factors, especially leaders’ evaluations, on the vote. In fact, even the role of the 
economy in shaping electoral outcomes is sometimes put into question, including in the 
more consolidated Southern European democracies (Hamann, 2000). On top of this, the 
increasing availability of polls and trial-heat tracking polls in new democracies favours 
a kind of approach to elections and their outcomes that pays great attention to campaign 
events, media coverage and leaders’ traits. We are not suggesting such findings or such 
approaches are necessarily wrong. However, particularly if our model turns out to 
perform as well with the 2009 election outcomes as well as it performs with past 
elections, we hope to have called attention to the need to start paying more attention to 
the elements that seem to stabilize and anchor voting behaviour in Portugal, as well as 
in other new democracies. Finally, it is often forgotten that, with the “third wave” of 
democratization, semi-presidentialism has in fact become “the most prevalent system of 
government in Europe” (Neto and Strøm, 2006: 623). Although semi-presidentialism is 
a very heterogeneous type of government, there are reasons to believe that, at least in 
some cases, the dynamics of premier-presidential relations play a crucial role in politics. 
Portugal is clearly one of such cases, and it is unlikely that it represents a mere outlier.
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Figure 1:
Nonlinear growth rate
Figure
Table 1
Variables’ values and within-sample and out-of-sample forecasts
Election
Yearly real 
GDP growth 
rate
(lagged q-2)
Premier-
presidential
conflict
Socialist
incumbent
Incumbent
vote share 
(%)
Predicted
vote share 
(%)
Residual
Out-of-
sample
forecast
(%)
Forecast
Residual
Apr. 15th, 1976 -1.08 0 1 34.89 34.79 0.10 34.47 0.42
Dec. 2nd, 1979 5.55 1 1 27.33a 24.33 3.00 22.15 5.18
Oct. 5th, 1980 5.02 1 0 28.57a/b 31.72 -3.15 32.68 -4.11
April 25th, 1983 2.34 1 0 27.24a 29.38 -2.14 30.04 -2.80
Oct. 6th, 1985 4.29 1 1 20.77a 23.35 -2.58 24.83 -4.06
July, 19th, 1987 5.16 0 0 50.22 51.13 -0.91 51.89 -1.67
Oct. 6th, 1991 2.95 0 0 50.6 49.27 1.33 48.55 2.05
Oct. 1st, 1995 2.69 1 0 34.12 29.73 4.39 28.46 5.66
Oct. 10th, 1999 4.44 0 1 44.06 42.77 1.29 41.97 2.09
Mar. 17th, 2002 1.22 0 1 37.79 39.60 -1.81 40.27 -2.48
Feb. 20th 2005 1.37 1 0 28.77a 28.29 0.48 28.09 0.68
a Vote for major party of incumbent coalition; b Estimated
Table 1
Table 2 
Forecasts for the incumbent’s vote share in the 2009 elections under different scenarios
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
GDP growth 1 0 5 1
Conflict 0 0 0 1
SocInc 1 1 1 1
Forecast (%) 39.3 37.1 43.2 20.0
Forecast std. error 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.4
Table 2
